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THE JUDGES AND TIlE LEISATUIRE
NEWMAN LEVY'

The crime wave that was supposed to be inundating the country
a ear or two ago seeni to have subsided. leaving behind in its wake
a residue of remedial and prophylactic legislation. The professional
and amateur Canutes who rallied to their country's aid in its hour of
distress stand along the shore and contemplate the receding wave of
crime; they look upon their work and see that it is good.
About the shore lies the flotsam and jetsam of legislation enacted amid the stress of a supposed emergency, and abiding with us,
now that the storm has more or less passed. Some of this legislation
is wise and of permanent value, some is of doubtful wisdom, and
some is ill-considered and bad, but all of it constitutes a glowing
tribute to our childlike faith in the efficacy of statutory enactment.
It may be questioned by some whether we Americans are inherently
a law-abiding people, but no one will ever deny that we are emphatically a law-enacting people. "There ought to be a law," is a
national slogan; legislation is our panacea for all the evils that afflict
us. It is a sad political truism, however, that laws are easy to enact
and difficult to remove. For better or for worse, these crime laws are
with us for some time to come, stamping sharply their imprint upon
the body of judicial thought.
I am not primarily concerned at the present moment with the
potency of these anti-crime laws as weapons with which to combat
crime. I am inclined to believe that as temporary palliatives they
may be fairly effective, although their ultimate value is somewhat
doubtful. Of far greater importance are the tendencies implicit in
much of this legislation-tendencies which seem to reflect a prevalent
lack of confidence in our courts and a popular distrust of judges.
These statutes which tend to limit the discretionary power of the
judiciary and to impose upon them a mandatory harshness, contrary
to the trend of current penology, are deserving of serious thought.
Along with our ingenuous belief in the efficacy of laws exists
a pervasive lack of confidence in Law-a popular distrust of courts,
judges and judicial institutions generally. This cynicism toward those
whom we place in public office is one of the curious phenomena of
our national psychology. It may be that there is an adequate historical
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explanation for this state of mind; our recent political history certainly affords some justification for it. The strange system of checks
and balances, which is our unique contribution to the science of
government, is predicated upon a fear of official aggression. We place
men in power and then do our best to render them powerless.
So long as this state of mind finds expression in restricting the
scope of administrative activity, although it may be regrettable, it
is not necessarily destructive. When it extends, however, to the judicial function it is fraught with more dangerous significance. It is
trite to say that a fearless and untrammeled judiciary is the ultimate
bulwark of our national liberty. A widespread distrust of the courts
is a symptom of weakness in the most vital of our institutions; when
this distrust is translated into legislative enactment it receives an official
sanction that should not remain unchallenged.
The best known of all recent criminal legislation are the New York
Baumes Laws. These laws have received more or less enthusiastic
commendation from all parts of the country, and have been copied
in several other states. They deal with many phases of criminal law
and criminal procedure but they are best known for their provisions
which increase the penalties for various crimes, and particularly for
those provisions which make certain severe punishments mandatory.
For example, take the changes made by the Baumes Laws in the
statutes referring to robbery and burglary. Prior to the 1926 amendment robbery in the first degree in New York was "punishable by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years."
This was
changed to read "Robbery in the first degree is punishable by imprisonment for a term not less than fifteen years." The maximum is
thereby increased to life imprisonment. Burglary in the first degree
was formerly punishable by imprisonment for not less than ten years.
This was amended to "not less than fifteen years."
The most widely discussed of all the Baumes Laws, in fact the
one that in the popular mind is known as The Baumes Law, is Section 1942 of the Penal Law. This section formerly read:
Sec. 1942.

PUNISHMENT FOR FOURTH CONVICTION OF FELONY.

A per-

son who, after having been three times convicted within this state, of felonies or attempts to commit felonies, or under the law of any other state,
government or country, of crimes which if committed within this state
would be felonious, commits a felony within this state, shall be sentenced
upon conviction of such fourth, or subsequent, offense to imprisonment in
a state prison for the term of his natural life, but after serving a period of
time equal to the maximum penalty prescribed for the-offense of which he
is convicted, less the usual commutation for good conduct, shall become
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subject to the jurisdiction of the board of coininissioners of paroled prisoners, and mnay be paroled upon such conlitions .s said board may prescribe,
but said board shall not grant an absolute discharge to such prisoner.

This was amended by striking out the italicized portion, making
it mandatory to send every fourth offender to prison for life.
It is unnecessary here to discuss the wisdom or the efficacy of
increasing the penalties for crime. Volumes have been written on
both sides of the subject. It may be questioned whether a criminal
who would take a chance on ten years imprisonment would be deterred by the possibility of receiving fifteen. The apologists for the
Baumes Laws have, undoubtedly statistics of a sort on their side.
The chief significance of these changes lies not in the fact that
they have made greater severity possible, but in that they have virtually
made justified leniency impossible. They not only increase the maximum penalties that a judge may impose, but they fix by rigid enactment mandatory minimum sentences. A judge is no longer permitted
to render judgment in accordance with his conscience, his judicial
experience and his appraisal of the human values involved; if the objective facts of a case coincide with a predetermined formula he has
no choice but to render judgment in accordance with the apocalyptic
pre-vision of Senator Baumes and his associates in the year nineteen
twenty-six.
There were, of course, some prescribed minimum sentences before the Baumes Laws, but for many years past, there has been a trend
toward greater flexibility in our penal statutes. If modern penology
has learned anything it has learned that there is no common denominator of crime. Each offense is a synthesis of social, economic and
biological factors, and intelligent treatment must depend, within practical limits, upon its peculiar circumstances. Thus there has been
developing a scientific approach toward punishment which is evidenced
by the working of the probation system in the Courts of General
Sessions in New York. The probation department acts as an advisory and investigating adjunct to the judges of the criminal courts.
It conducts a thorough investigation after conviction and before sentence into all aspects of a defendent's life. When a judge imposes
sentence he has before him all possible data to enable him to arrive
at a wise and just decision.
The maximum and minimum provisions of the penal laws, the
indeterminate sentence, and last, and most important, the suspended
sentence gives the sentencing judge an opportunity to arrive at as
close an approximation of justice as is possible under a codified
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penology. Stated in its simplest terms the theory of the law is that
Judge Blank with all the facts before him is better fitted to decide
at the time of sentence what should be done for or to John Doe up
before him for robbery, than were the well meaning and undoubtedly
competent legislators in Albany several years before the commission
of the crime.
The new dispensation in penal legislation has, in a measure,
destroyed this flexibility of the law and has substituted for it a mechanical rigidity. It has reverted to an archaic determinism that states
in effect that an offense which may be committed ten years hence
which conforms to a predetermined formula must be visited with a
predetermined penalty regardless of the peculiar facts of the case.
It has been urged by the defenders of the Baumes Laws that
these mandatory punishments apply to offenses which are by definition
so heinous as to warrant extreme severity. Assuming this to be so,
ample scope could be given by merely increasing the possible maximum penalties. But this would give criminal judges wide discretion
in sentencing convicts, a discretion which the reformers of our criminal law evidently believe the judges are not fit to exercise.
This belief finds expression in the astounding dictum of the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Department, in the recent case of People v. Gowasky, 219 App. Div. 19.
In that case, which upheld the constitutionality of Section 1942 of the
Peiial Law (quoted above), the court said:
"During recent years the tendency has been toward leniency to those
convicted of crime. Statutes have been enacted tending more and more to
lighten the severity of punishment. Judicial discretion has been exercised
in favor of criminals to a degree before unheard of, and those charged
with the commission of crime and awaiting trial, often hardened criminals,
have been admitted to bail and turned loose to continue their careers of
crime. The furnishing of bail bonds has become a business, and until
brought to trial, the accused, through easy bail, is but momentarily halted
in his professional pursuits. We have no doubt that such conditions as
these were largely responsible for taking away from judges all discretion
in cases of the confirmed criminal who has been four times convicted of a
felony, and in the interest of public safety to prevent in such a case the
exercise of a discretion all too often abused. Judicial discretion in imposing punishment for crime has long been a recognized principle of our
criminal jurisprudence. In theory its exercise is quite unassailable. Such
discretion, however, is subject to abuse, and recent instances are not rare
where it has been improperly exercised. There comes a time when discretion should end, and the Legislature by the statute here under consideration, placed a fourth conviction of a felony as beyond the pale of judicial

discretion."
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I have stated above that the crime laws have by implication given
official sanction to the widespread distrust of the courts. This distrust now receives confirmation and support in the language of the
courts themselves. The very judges who should most jealously guard
the integrity of the judicial office bear witness to the frequent abuse
of judicial discretion and give approval to these increasing limitations
upon the judicial function. Is there any wonder that the critics
of our judicial system feel that their criticisms are justified, and
that the pervasive lack of confidence in the courts receives new strength?
Judge Joseph M. Proskauer of the New York Supreme Court in a
brilliant address recently delivered before the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York stated that one of the obstacles in the way of
scientific legal reform was an "instinctive distrust of magistrates.
The American psychology of distrust of the magistrate" he said, "must
end. That is one reason why reform necessitates a change in the lay
attitude toward the profession. We have got to see to it that we get
good judges and let them function; and when I say 'we,' I mean not
only the profession, but the lay public as well."
Judge Proskauer was speaking of civil procedure but his remarks
have a pertinent application to criminal trials. How to "get good
judges," assuming that we do not have them now, is not a simple
problem. Certainly we shall not git theMn by divesting their office
of the dignity that is attached to a position of power and trust.
It may be that I exaggerate the importance of these legislative
tendencies. Included in the recent program for reform of criminal
procedure have been measures that would permit the more active participation of the judge in criminal trials. The right of a judge to
comment on the evidence, for example, one of the measures espoused
by the Baumes Committee, might be pointed out as an attempt to enlarge the judicial power. Actually this and similar measures have been
intended, not primarily to increase the judges' power, but to strengthen
the prosecution-the judge already having the right under the existing procedure to make any comment favorable to the defendant.
In other words, the range of judicial severity is extended, but not
the range of discretion.
Our legal system today is on the defensive. The growth of private
arbitration and the development of lay tribunals for the settlement
if private controversies all point to a weakening faith in the efficacy of
legal mechanism. For this reason the integrity of the judiciary should
be jealously guarded and any attempt to encroach upon its prerogatives should be promptly challenged. The time may come when a more
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scientific system will supplant the present one. Governor Smith's advocacy of a permanent sentencing commission seems to presage new
and radical developments. But for the present we shall have to struggle
along with the existing machinery. A legal system is as effective
as its judges. If we have strong intelligent judges there is ample
elasticity in our present system of laws to permit of quick and impartial justice, without the haphazard legislative tinkering with which
we have been recently afflicted. And we cannot expect to have the
kind of judges we need if every shift of popular opinion is seized
as an excuse further to strip the judiciary of its necessary powers.

